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This volume contains papers presented at "Frontiers in Health Policy
Research," a conference held in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 1997.
Convened by the National Bureau of Economic Research, the confer-
ence brought together academic economists who study issues of criti-
cal importance to health care policy and people whose expertise and
interests are in the design and implementation of national policy
leading government officials, journalists, industry experts, researchers,
and legislative staff. The conference was motivated by the belief that
more extensive dialogue between the policy and academic communi-
ties would help make the work of the academic researchers more
useful and relevant and that the results of their research could be
helpful in assessing the consequences of alternative policies being
considered in Washington and elsewhere. The conference is patterned
after NBER's highly successful annual conference series, Tax Policy
and the Economy, which began more than ten years ago and has been
an important channel of communication between public finance re-
searchers and tax policy experts.
The conference was held in a time of tumultuous changes in the
organization of health care and its private financing. Perhaps the most
striking change was the continued growth of managed care, which
attracted substantial scrutiny and public concern about the impact of
these changes on health care costs and on both the quality of and access
to care. Did some groups suffer from denial of care, and did those that
had access to care, such as the elderly, receive more limited and
lower-quality services? Was managed care really saving money, or did
it merely shift the burden of payment to patients and their families?
The high rate of growth in the number of Medicare recipients choosing
"risk contracts," or prepaid health service plans like those offered by
health maintenance organizations, brought these issues to the federalxii Introduction
government, particularly because Medicare represented one of the
largest and most challenging federal entitlement programs.
After federal attempts to pass comprehensive health care reform
bills failed, the private sector seemed to take the lead in transforming
the market for health care. However, even though the initiatives were
less sweeping than those debated earlier in the decade, federal interest
in exploring ways to improve health care delivery and financing re-
mained. In many respects, classic problems in health economics re-
mained just as relevant for new reforms as for existing approaches to
health policy. For example, adverse selection was a significant weak-
ness of both proposed federal reforms and existing competitive insur-
ance markets. Adverse selection occurs whenever insurance plans
attract enrollees whose risk characteristicsand expected claims
deviate significantly from averages for the population. Health insur-
ance plans that are more attractive to "high-risk" enrollees have pre-
dictably higher utilizationof health care and therefore higher
expenditures. Thus any increase in revenues from the premiums such
plans attract is usually less than the added costs they bear when they
enroll high-risk individuals. The consequences of adverse selection
may be as severe as the collapse of health insurance markets, or more
likely, the redesign of insurance plans to minimize its impact.
Although this phenomenon is ordinarily considered most important
in private insurance markets, adverse selection may also have been the
most important drawback to the proposal to allow Medicare recipients
to participate in medical savings accounts (MSAs). MSAs consist of
tax-advantaged savings accounts intended to pay for all but cata-
strophic health expenditures. Because participation in MSAs would
have been optional, allowing Medicare recipients to choose freely
between traditional Medicare and a plan that provided catastrophic
insurance with the savings plan, there were fears that healthy Medicare
recipients would choose MSAs, whereas those who used Medicare-
financed services heavily would stay in the traditional plan. The loss
of the low-risk enrollees would greatly raise the average costs of the
traditional program.
Because adverse selection is a pervasive problem for health insur-
ance, it is grist for the health economist's mill. Yet the literature on this
subject proposes few fully satisfactory solutions. Despite the lack of
ideal solutions, policymakers who ignore adverse selection do so at
their peril. This theme emerges from the study by David Cutler and
Richard Zeckhauser on risk sorting across health insurance plans. TheyIntroduction xiii
explain the phenomenon in particularly lucid terms, examining its
consequences in two large groups of Massachusetts employees. They
present a clear taxonomy of the types of losses adverse selection
induces, which include mismatching between enrollees and health
insurance plans, vitiation of some of insurance's risk-reducing proper-
ties, and inefficient characteristics that health insurance policies must
incorporate to reduce adverse selection. Some of their findings are
unexpected and intriguing. For example, many employers now at-
tempt to equalize the employer contribution to health insurance plans
offered to their employees, so that employees who choose high-cost
plans must pay the added premiums themselves. At Harvard Univer-
sity, one of the employers studied, the implementation of equal em-
ployer contributions resulted in the disappearance of the most
generous health insurance policy in less than three years. The other
group studied, the Group Insurance Commission of Massachusetts,
sustained the most generous policy it offered by subsidizing it and
directly managing its costs. These findings highlight the frequent
observation that the presence of health insurance and its peculiar
characteristics often means that the application of straightforward,
well-accepted economic principles in the context of market failures
induced by health insurance can lead to unanticipated, undesirable
outcomes.
Because they suffer disproportionately from chronic diseases, the
elderly are particularly heavy users of health care. Consequently they
may have much to gainor losewith changes in health care markets.
In many respects, the elderly are the best-insured Americans. Nearly
all have hospital insurance under Medicare Part A, and the over-
whelming majority have coverage for physicians' services under Medi-
care Part B. Nevertheless, Medicare coverage has large gaps. For
example, elderly Americans who lack supplemental private insurance
must bear the cost of prescription drugs themselves, because Medicare
does not pay for them. For many of the elderly, such drugs represent
a very large out-of-pocket expense. Thus it is natural to ask whether
changes in the market for drugssuch as the introduction of new
drugs and changes in the prices of existing drugshave imposed a
particularly onerous economic burden on the elderly.
Determining the prices that are paid for drugs at either the whole-
sale or retail level, and even constructing a price index for drugs,
require a number of judgments about changes in the mix of drugs that
people use and which set of prices to apply. As part of a generalxiv Introduction
research effort to understand changes in the price and quality of drugs
over time, Ernst Berndt and colleagues examined whether changes in
the price of prescription drugs over time disproportionately affected
the elderly. They posit two alternative hypotheses about how the
elderly would be affected.
First, the elderly may be considered more fragile, and therefore
preferentially receive newer treatments that are more convenient to
use and less likely to cause side effects or interactions with other drugs.
Thus the elderly would be more likely to receive newer, branded
drugs; if price inflation is greater for these products, the elderly would
experience more rapid increases in drug costs than the young. A
second. hypothesis recognizes that the elderly often continue to use the
same drug for many years, particularly if it is working well. If this
effect predominates, the elderly would disproportionately use older
drugs, often available in generic form, whose prices tend to rise less
rapidly than branded drugs. Then their rate of price inflation would be
less than for the young.
Using sophisticated methodology and a unique set of data on pre-
scription pharmaceutical sales and pricing from 1990 to 1996, Berndt
and colleagues find support for both hypotheses but for different drug
classes. Price inflation in antibiotics used by the elderly was greater
than for those used by the young, in part because the elderly tended
to use newer drug formulations that had fewer side effects. On the
other hand, the elderly tended to use older, less-expensive antidepres-
sants than the young, resulting in a lower than average rate of inflation
for the elderly than for the young treated with this class of drugs. For
calcium channel blockers, used primarily to treat hypertension and
angina pectoris, there was no significant difference in the rate of
growth of prices in drugs used by the elderly or the young. These
results suggest that overall the elderly are not subject to greater infla-
tion in drug cost than the young, although the elderly who lack
supplemental insurance and live on fixed incomes may be more vul-
nerable than the young to the financial cost associated with drug price
rises.
One of the forces expected to moderate expenditure growth is the
change in the way that Americans receive their health care. More and
more are enrolling in managed-care plans, which incorporate a variety
of features to limit health care utilization and control costs. Many
managed-care plans pay providers on a completely or partially capi-
tated basis, meaning that some or all health services are provided fora fixed fee paid either annually or monthly. The incentives implicit in
most managed-care plans offer the hope that costs can be controlled
and stimulate fears that effective care will be denied and the quality of
health services will decline. Two chapters address how managed care
has influenced the growth of health expenditures. One, by Cutler and
Louise Sheiner, examines cross-state data to assess how the expansion
of managed care influenced the growth of medical expenditures gen-
erally; the other, by Laurence Baker and Sharmila Shakarkumar, looks
at similar issues specifically for Medicare. Cutler and Sheiner find that
in states in which managed-care enrollment increased, the rate of cost
growth for hospital care slowed. Although states with more managed
care tended also to experience greater growth in spending for physi-
cians' services, the decline in hospital expenditures more than offset
this growth. Their results challenge the traditional view of HMOs'
effect on health care costs. Evidence obtained from two decades ago
suggests that HMOs achieve substantial savings compared to fee-for-
service plans, largely by reducing hospital utilization. But the rate of
growth of expenditures, according to the traditional view, is the same
for HMOs and other health care financing plans. This implies that a
switch from fee-for-service to HMOs will produce only transient sav-
ings, because the growth in expenditures will make HMO costs reach
the levels of fee-for-service in a few years. Cutler and Sheiner's work,
in contrast, indicates that managed care may indeed dampen medical
expenditure growth by slowing the adoption of new technologies, so
that managed care may have far more significant effects on long-term
expenditure growth than previous studies suggested.
The Baker and Shankarkumar study emphasizes the importance of
"spillover effects," the effects of managed-care penetration on the
economic behavior of nonmanaged-care providers. In particular, they
hypothesize that greater competition introduced by managed care may
cause providers, even those reimbursed on a traditional fee-for-service
basis, to lower prices or change the type or intensity of the care they
provide. If such effects occur, typical estimates of the overall effects of
managed care on health expenditures may be too small. To investigate
this issue, Baker and Shankarkumar explore geographic variation in
HMO market share and expenditures for Medicare beneficiaries en-
rolled in the traditional fee-for-service plans. They find that managed
care's penetration in the local health care market, for both Medicare
and non-Medicare recipients, is associated with declines in both Part A
and Part B fee-for-service expenditures. Notably, this effect does not
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specifically reflect the percentage of Medicare recipients in an area who
enroll in managed-care plans. Increases in the Medicare HlvlO market
share, as opposed to the overall HMO market share, are associated
with increases in Part A expenditures and with only small decreases in
Part B expenditures. This study strongly supports the view that man-
aged care has effects on health care delivery and pricing that extend
well beyond enrollees in managed-care plans.
Health insurance, whether provided by government or the private
sector, has an important role in protecting the most vulnerable popu-
lations, such as patients with chronic illnesses or severe acute illnesses
that result in very high expenditures. Changes in health care financing
that allow greater choice may paradoxically disadvantage such indi-
viduals Choice can affect them adversely because it can interfere with
their ability to benefit from wider pooling of risk; individuals who
expect to have lower than average expenditures will tend to choose
plans that cost less or provide a more attractive bundle of services,
whereas plans with higher premiums and more comprehensive cover-
age for serious illnesses or a wider choice of providers tend to attract
an increasingly high-risk group of enrollees. Eventually, the compre-
hensive, expensive health insurance plans may cease to exist because
their costs, and premiums, become prohibitive as they attract an in-
creasingly high-risk group of subscribers. This form of adverse selec-
tion is most likely when high expenditures are predictable. The
distribution of health expenditures, both for Medicare and for the
general population, suggests that individuals differ greatly in their
health care consumption, so adverse selection is likely to be a major
problem.
It is well known, for example, that a small proportion of all Medicare
recipients account for a greatly disproportionate share of program
expenditures. Much of what is known, however, is based on single
years or single episodes of care. Is it possible to identify a population
of patients who can be expected to have very high costs of health care
year after year? One factor that would mitigate any such effects is the
high mortality rate associated with high expenditures. Medicare recipi-
ents in the last year of life, for example, consume much more health
care than the average Medicare recipient, adjusted for age and sex. If
many or most of the very high-cost Medicare recipients die, high
expenditures should not persist from one year to the next. The paper
by my colleagues Thomas MaCurdy, Mark McClellan, and me investi-
gates skewness in expenditures both within a year and across manyIntroduction xvii
years to gain insights into the predictability of high expenditures and
the likelihood that adverse selection would be a problem over a long
time period. We find that, from 1987 to 1995, high-cost users were
responsible for much of the growth of Medicare's hospital payments.
However, payments for physician services grew mainly because more
beneficiaries used the services. Very few Medicare beneficiaries remain
in the highest cost categories for multiple years, limiting the magnitude
of expenditure persistence, but we find that high expenditures are
sufficiently persistent to pose major adverse-selection problems. Any
policy reform will need to recognize this characteristic of Medicare
expenditures.
Like other ongoing work of NBER's Program in Health Care, the
studies reported here are intended to offer new information and per-
spectives on key health policy issues to inform discussions about
possible solutions to existing and future problems in health care
financing and delivery. We hope that these contributions will stimulate
further dialogue and ultimately advance the development of innova-
tive solutions to health policy problems.